On 2 June 2014 14:10, Vitaliy M wrote: > > It was a wholly > > impractical device and would never have been able to be "weaponised" > > Seems to be contradicted by > > > the rapidly fleeing release plane > No. This is not a 'specialist area' of mine, even as a hobby :-) - but I have read substantial comment re the device from various places along the way. The consistent message was that Kruschev wanted a message. Practicality was immaterial. 10 MT and 256 kB should be enough for anyone. 30 October 1961. Comment on weaponisation and scenario here: http://www.tsarbomba.org/ "... The bomb served no military purposes. For that, it would be too heavy to carry and there was no plane able to do intercontinental flights with such a load. ..." " ...The development of the Tsar Bomba was rushed, since Nikita Khrushchev wanted the bomb to be detonated during the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party held between October 17 and October 31 1961. ..." "... Assembly was carried out in parallel with designing. The design of the bomb posed serious questions. Its weight of 27 tones was two and a half times the Tu-95's normal weapon loads and close to the plane's total weightload. Since the Tsar Bomba was too big, the Tu-95 had to be slightly modified; the bomb doors had to be removed. Also a custom parachute had to be built in order to slow the bomb's descent so that the plane has enough time to get to a safe place. ... " _______________ "Weaponisation" has many aspects. Delivery size is only one - but a big one - a very big one in this case. Apart from that it was essentially a laboratory environment device pressed into real world service for political aims. The logistics of making it work were horrendous and in no way suited to a 'real time' weapons delivery situation. R --=20 http://www.piclist.com/techref/piclist PIC/SX FAQ & list archive View/change your membership options at http://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/piclist .