On 17 Aug 2000, at 13:46, Dan Michaels wrote:

> Andy K wrote:
> ...........
> >
> >I had a guy I worked with, a MSEE, who had a (TS+compartmental+cryto) clearance
> >in Korea when he was in charge of communications at one of our bases.
> >
> >When he got a civilian job, it took over a year for them to clear him to a
> >Secret _because_ of his prior stuff.
> >
> >Whoda thunk!?!
> >
>
> Overseas, near the communist border - bad, really bad. Where did he
> go on vacations? What did he do on weekends? Who did he know? Who
> did he talk to? Where did he drink? Who frequented the places he
> hung out at? Were any of his friends and acquaintances of oriental
> ancestry? And that's just the "special" questions in his particular
> case. They check **everything**.
>
> --
As a foreign national using U.S. leading edge access control and
point monitoring gear, I had a good many laughs at U.S. govt
paranoia.
Like being absolutely, totally and completely forbidden under pain of
death to be allowed to purchase to a Ollivette 3B2 computer (as used
by the U.S. Navy) with internal encryption, for one of our access
control systems. Only to order one when I got back to N.Z. and one
promptly arrived, the local Ollivette rep said... just dont tell the U.S., it
has the encryption, what they dont know doesn't hurt them ( I got the
impression they were pissed off with the secret squirrels pushing
them around).
Similar stories with point monitoring gear and security clearances
(real fun after N.Z. had just gone anti-nuclear at the time). But thats
a LONG story.

_____________________________

Lance Allen
Technical Officer
Uni of Auckland
Psych Dept
New Zealand

www.psych.auckland.ac.nz

_____________________________

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